"Gallantry in Action": Evidence of Advantageous Selection in a Voluntary Army

Javier Birchenall and Thomas G. Koch

Journal of Law and Economics, 2015, vol. 58, issue 1, 111 - 138

Abstract: A voluntary army's quality exceeds or falls below a drafted army's average quality depending on whether selection is advantageous or adverse. Using a collection of data sets that cover the majority of the US Army soldiers during World War II, we test for adverse selection into the army. Rather, we find advantageous selection: volunteers and drafted men showed no significant difference in fatalities, but volunteers earned distinguished awards at a higher rate than drafted men, particularly after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Analyses at the level of units concur with our findings based on enlistment records.

Date: 2015
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