When Can We Expect a Corporate Leniency Program to Result in Fewer Cartels?

Joseph E. Harrington and Myong-Hun Chang ()

Journal of Law and Economics, 2015, vol. 58, issue 2, 417 - 449

Abstract: Leniency programs have become widespread and are generally quite active as reflected in the number of applications. What is not well understood is how they affect the number of cartels. This paper develops and explores a theoretical framework to help understand when leniency programs are likely to be effective in reducing the presence of cartels. Plausible conditions are derived whereby a leniency program can result in more cartels. On a more positive note, we identify situations and policies that a competition authority can pursue that will make it more likely that a leniency program will have the intended effect of reducing the number of cartels.

Date: 2015
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