Bounded Rationality and the Choice of Jury Selection Procedures

Martin Van der Linden

Journal of Law and Economics, 2018, vol. 61, issue 4, 711 - 738

Abstract: A peremptory-challenge procedure allows the parties to a jury trial to dismiss some prospective jurors without justification. Complex challenge procedures offer an unfair advantage to parties who are better able to strategize. I introduce a new measure of strategic complexity based on level-k thinking and use this measure to compare challenge procedures often used in practice. In applying this measure, I overturn some commonly held beliefs about which jury selection procedures are strategically simple.

Date: 2018
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