Financial Reporting Frequency and Corporate Innovation
Huai Zhang and
Journal of Law and Economics, 2020, vol. 63, issue 3, 501 - 530
We examine how the regulation of financial reporting frequency affects corporate innovation. We use a difference-in-differences approach based on a sample of treatment firms that experience a change in their reporting frequency and matched industry peers and control firms whose reporting frequency remains unchanged. We find that higher reporting frequency significantly reduces treatment firms’ innovation output but find no evidence that the net externality effect on industry peers is statistically significant. Together, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that frequent reporting induces managerial myopia and impedes corporate innovation.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/708706
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Journal of Law and Economics from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().