EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Franchise Contract Regulations and Local Market Structure

Charles Murry () and Peter Newberry

Journal of Law and Economics, 2022, vol. 65, issue 1, 105 - 130

Abstract: Many US states have regulations that restrict the ability of franchisors to terminate franchise contracts. We estimate the economic effects of these regulations with a focus on how they impact market structure. Using data from the quick-service restaurant industry, we find that implementing franchise regulations results in 4–5 percent fewer establishments in the average county. Our results imply that franchise regulation leads to increased concentration in a large number of markets, as the number of counties in the bottom quartile of concentration would increase by between 12 percent and 15 percent with regulation.

Date: 2022
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/717159 (application/pdf)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/717159 (text/html)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
Working Paper: Franchise Contract Regulations and Local Market Structure (2021) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/717159

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Law and Economics from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().

 
Page updated 2022-10-29
Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/717159