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Exclusion of Extreme Jurors and Minority Representation: The Effect of Jury Selection Procedures

Andrea Moro and Martin Van der Linden

Journal of Law and Economics, 2024, vol. 67, issue 2, 295 - 336

Abstract: We compare two jury selection procedures meant to safeguard against the inclusion of biased jurors but are perceived as causing minorities to be underrepresented. The strike-and-replace procedure presents potential jurors one by one to the parties, while the struck procedure presents all potential jurors to the parties before they exercise their challenges. The struck procedure more effectively excludes extreme jurors but leads to a worse representation of minorities. The advantage of the struck procedure in terms of excluding extremes is sizable in a wide range of cases. In contrast, the strike-and-replace procedure better represents minorities only if the minority and majority are polarized. Results are robust to assuming that the parties statistically discriminate against jurors on the basis of group identity.

Date: 2024
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