Revolutionary Constitutional Compliance

Jamie Bologna Pavlik, Justin T. Callais and Andrew T. Young

Journal of Law and Economics, 2026, vol. 69, issue 4, 899 - 931

Abstract: Revolutions are bottom-up movements for regime change that, if successful, overthrow and replace a society’s principal institutions. A successful revolution is often followed by a new constitution. We explore whether revolutionary constitutions, all else being equal, lead to higher compliance than their nonrevolutionary counterparts. To do so we combine data from the Comparative Constitutional Compliance Database and the Revolutionary Episodes Dataset. We identify 18 revolutionary constitutions, adopted between 1963 and 2014, and consider their compliance relative to that of their predecessors. We employ matching methods and event studies. The estimated effects are generally positive and most compelling for overall constitutional compliance and the individual areas of basic human rights and civil rights.

Date: 2026
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