Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or "Let Them Be Bribed."

Pablo Spiller

Journal of Law and Economics, 1990, vol. 33, issue 1, 65-101

Date: 1990
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