The Impact of Collective-Bargaining Legislation on Disputes in the U.S. Public Sector: No Legislation May Be the Worst Legislation

Janet Currie and Sheena McConnell

Journal of Law and Economics, 1994, vol. 37, issue 2, 519-47

Abstract: This article estimates the impact of collective-bargaining legislation on disputes during labor negotiations in the U.S. public sector. We use a large national sample of U.S. state and local government contracts to compare the incidence and intensity of disputes by similar workers under different forms of collective-bargaining legislation. The breadth of our data allows us to examine the impact of five different forms of legislation. Our principal finding is that dispute costs are highest in jurisdictions that provide no explicit framework for bargaining or dispute resolution. Strikes are as frequent and as long when they are illegal and employers are not required to bargain with employees as when they are legal but employers are required to bargain. Arbitration is most frequently used when formal institutions for arbitration have been provided. Copyright 1994 by the University of Chicago.

Date: 1994
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/467322 (application/pdf)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:37:y:1994:i:2:p:519-47

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Law and Economics from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().