The Politics of Infrastructure

W. Crain and Lisa K Oakley

Journal of Law and Economics, 1995, vol. 38, issue 1, 1-17

Abstract: A number of recent studies attempt to measure the productivity of public capital. Some estimates indicate that government investments are a potential wellspring for economic progress, while others indicate that public infrastructure has a negligible effect on private sector output. This article investigates political institutions and processes underlying the decisions for public infrastructure spending. We apply the framework of strategic models of fiscal policy and develop an empirical model to analyze the substantial differences in public capital across American states. Institutions such as term limits, citizen initiative, and budgeting procedures were significant determinants of state public capital stocks and the flow of new public investments during the 1980s. The results further suggest that political conditions such as legislative stability and voter volatility are systematically related to infrastructure differences across states. Copyright 1995 by the University of Chicago.

Date: 1995
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (46)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/467323 (application/pdf)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:38:y:1995:i:1:p:1-17

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Law and Economics from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().