The Spectrum as Commons: Tomorrow's Vision, Not Today's Prescription

Timothy Brennan

Journal of Law and Economics, 1998, vol. 41, issue 2, 791-803

Abstract: Eli Noam has proposed using nascent technologies to treat the electromagnetic spectrum as an open-access commons rather than as a subdivided collection of property rights. In his view, public auctions reduce competition, threaten free speech, foster fiscal mismanagement, and presume illegitimate government ownership of spectrum. But government auctioning is our collective decision to sell that which we all "own" to foster spectrum efficiency via the market. Threats to free speech are exaggerated, especially when asserted on behalf of corporations. Noam correctly observes that a government auctioneer might make too little spectrum available, but concerns about fostering oligopoly are exaggerated. His open-access alternative would likely increase the cost of assembling the substantial long-term rights to use spectrum for standardized, reliable telecommunication services. If the benefits of open access ever exceed the costs, spectrum owners could carry out the necessary subdivision, management, and congestion-based pricing. Copyright 1998 by the University of Chicago.

Date: 1998
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/467413 (application/pdf)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:41:y:1998:i:2:p:791-803

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Law and Economics from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().