Waiting to Be Protected under the Endangered Species Act: The Political Economy of Regulatory Delay

Amy Ando

Journal of Law and Economics, 1999, vol. 42, issue 1, 29-60

Abstract: This paper uses duration analysis to evaluate the ability of interest groups to influence the timing of decisions to add species to the endangered species list by exerting pressure on the Fish and Wildlife Service. Using data from 1990 to 1994, it finds that public opposition and support can substantially slow and hasten, respectively, the progress of candidate species through the parts of the listing process most directly under the agency's control. Since the Service is not an atypical agency, similar patterns of public influence on delay may exist in other areas of bureaucratic decision making as well. Copyright 1999 by the University of Chicago.

Date: 1999
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