Airline Code-Share Alliances and Their Competitive Effects

Philip Gayle ()

Journal of Law and Economics, 2007, vol. 50, issue 4, 781-819

Abstract: Code-share alliances have become a prominent feature in the competitive landscape of the airline industry. However, policy makers are extremely hesitant to approve proposed code-share alliances when the potential partners’ route networks have significant overlap. The main concern is that an alliance may facilitate price collusion on partners’ overlapping routes. This article shows how policy makers can use a structural econometric framework to quantify the competitive effects of proposed code-share alliances, where potential alliance partners compete on overlapping routes in the prealliance industry. As an example, I apply the econometric model to the Delta/Continental/Northwest alliance. This proposed alliance was initially greeted with skepticism by the U.S. Department of Transportation owing to the potential partners’ unprecedented level of route network overlap. For the markets considered in my analyses, it appears as though the ultimate approval of the alliance by policy makers was justified.

Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:50:y:2007:p:781-819

DOI: 10.1086/519818

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