Ticket Pricing under Demand Uncertainty

Pascal Courty

Journal of Law and Economics, 2003, vol. 46, issue 2, 627-52

Abstract: This paper studies the case of a monopolist who sells tickets to consumers who learn new information about their demands over time. The monopolist can sell early to uninformed consumers and/or close to the event date to informed ones, or it can ration tickets and allow ticket holders to resell. I show that rationing and intertemporal sales are never optimal. More surprising, the monopolist cannot do strictly better by allowing resale. I discuss the implications of the model for the pricing practices observed in ticket markets.

Date: 2003
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Working Paper: Ticket Pricing Under Demand Uncertainty (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlawec:y:2003:v:46:i:2:p:627-52

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