Do Corporate Control and Product Market Competition Lead to Stronger Productivity Growth? Evidence from Market-Oriented and Blockholder-Based Governance Regimes

Jens Koke and Luc Renneboog

Journal of Law and Economics, 2005, vol. 48, issue 2, 475-516

Abstract: We investigate the impact of corporate governance and product market competition on productivity of German and U.K. firms. We find a strong positive relation between productivity and product market competition and various governance mechanisms. In poorly performing U.K. firms, the presence of strong outside blockholders leads to substantial increases in productivity. In contrast, for poorly performing and distressed German firms, it is bank debt concentration that stimulates productivity growth. Whereas high bank debt concentration also supports productivity growth in profitable German firms, leverage is unrelated to productivity growth in U.K. firms. Weak product market competition in the United Kingdom has a negative impact on productivity growth in both widely held and concentrated firms, with the exception of firms controlled by insiders. For profitable German firms, only control by banks, insurance firms, and the government can somewhat reduce the negative effect of weak product market competition.

Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (48)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/428019 (application/pdf)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
Working Paper: Do Corporate Control and Product Market Competition Lead to Stronger Productivity Growth? Evidence from Market-Oriented and Blockholder-Based Governance Regimes (2003)
Working Paper: Do Corporate Control and Product Market Competition Lead to Stronger Productivity Growth? Evidence from Market-Oriented and Blockholder-Based Governance Regimes (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlawec:y:2005:v:48:i:2:p:475-516

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Law and Economics from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().