Social Incentives, Delivery Agents, and the Effectiveness of Development Interventions

Oriana Bandiera, Robin Burgess, Erika Deserranno, Ricardo Morel, Munshi Sulaiman and Imran Rasul

Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, 2023, vol. 1, issue 1, 162 - 224

Abstract: There has been a rise in the use of the local delivery model for development interventions, where local agents are hired as intermediaries to target benefits to potential beneficiaries. We study this model in the context of a standard agricultural extension intervention in Uganda. We document a trade-off between coverage and targeting: delivery agents treat more farmers when they have a greater number of social ties, but they are significantly more likely to target their nonpoor ties. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for the design of the local delivery model for antipoverty interventions.

Date: 2023
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Working Paper: Social incentives, delivery agents, and the effectiveness of development interventions (2023)
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