Bad Repetition

Geoffroy de Clippel and Kareen Rozen

Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, 2023, vol. 1, issue 3, 447 - 462

Abstract: While most experimental papers on repeated games explore the benefits of repeated interactions, we explore the often-overlooked potential for negative implications. We demonstrate this possibility in the lab with a standard random-termination protocol applied to a new, simple, and easily interpretable stage game, capturing stylized aspects of bystander complacency.

Date: 2023
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