Effect of Campaign Contributions on Legislator Behavior: Intra–Dairy Industry Interest Group Competition

Kevin Dwyer and Thomas Stratmann

Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, 2023, vol. 1, issue 4, 746 - 780

Abstract: In the 1996 farm bill, the House of Representatives passed a bill reducing government protections for farmers by 2000. Before its implementation in 1999, the chamber passed a bill reversing these changes. We test the hypothesis that the reversal occurred because of changes in the allocation of campaign contributions from farmers, competing processors, and grocers. To estimate causal effects, we employ a legislator fixed effect logit model. The findings support the hypothesis that the strategic allocation of funds by special interests caused the legislative body to reverse its 1996 vote.

Date: 2023
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/726845 (application/pdf)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/726845 (text/html)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jpemic:doi:10.1086/726845

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().