Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion

Konstantinos Matakos, Riikka Savolainen, Orestis Troumpounis, Janne Tukiainen and Dimitrios Xefteris

Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, 2024, vol. 2, issue 4, 883 - 916

Abstract: By utilizing unique data capturing candidates’ ideological positions in Finnish municipal elections and leveraging exogenous changes in council size at different population thresholds as a proxy for electoral rule disproportionality and the expected advantage to the election winner, we identify a positive effect of council size on party cohesion. We propose the following mechanism: if a more diverse set of candidates is electorally appealing but less efficient in serving policy-related goals, parties face weaker incentives to maintain cohesion in institutional settings, such as smaller councils, which reward higher vote shares more generously.

Date: 2024
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Related works:
Working Paper: Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion (2018)
Working Paper: Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion (2018)
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