Voting Systems and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from Runoff and Plurality Elections

Davide Cipullo

National Tax Journal, 2021, vol. 74, issue 2, 347 - 376

Abstract: This paper compares policy outcomes under the runoff voting system and the plurality rule by exploiting the assignment of municipalities in Italy to different voting systems based on a population threshold. Mayors, who are the head of the local political power, are elected using a plurality rule in municipalities having fewer than 15,000 residents, while they are elected using a runoff system in municipalities above the threshold. Regression-discontinuity estimates show that municipalities under the runoff system spend 12 percent more than those under the plurality rule and that additional expenditures are not financed via higher taxation.

Date: 2021
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