Institutional Choice & Interest Groups in the Development of American Patent Law: 1790–1865

Andrew P. Morriss and Craig Allen Nard

Supreme Court Economic Review, 2011, vol. 19, issue 1, 143 - 244

Abstract: This article analyzes the evolution of U.S. patent law between the first patent act in 1790 and 1865. We argue that this evolution is best understood through an interest group-based analysis, focused on the question of the choice of which institution interest groups select in their efforts to alter the law. Although the federal courts have generally been viewed as relatively costly to capture, we contend that the early nineteenth-century federal bench was often less costly for pro-patent interests to influence than the contemporaneous Congresses. The heavy reliance on the courts during this crucial period of patent law’s evolution thus makes sense.

Date: 2011
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