Doctrinal Antithesis in Anglo-American Administrative Law

Eric C. Ip

Supreme Court Economic Review, 2015, vol. 22, issue 1, 147 - 180

Abstract: English administrative law guards judicial supremacy over all matters of statutory interpretation, while instructing judges to refrain from scrutinizing administrators' factual findings. By contrast, American federal courts are obliged to respect agencies' statutory-interpretive autonomy, but take a rigorous "hard look" at substantial agency factual determinations. This Article argues that the antithetical approaches to judicial review of administrative action adopted by the apex courts of the United Kingdom and the United States can be adequately explained by the polarization of these two polities along a spectrum of effective vetogates.

Date: 2015
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