Are Price Controls Fair?

David Schmidtz

Supreme Court Economic Review, 2015, vol. 23, issue 1, 221 - 233

Abstract: The neoclassical economic model predicts that price controls lead to deadweight losses. In experimental auction markets, actual deadweight loss is greater than what the neoclassical model predicts, because access on the buyer side under price controls is more random in practice than what the neoclassical model predicts. The randomness that accounts for losses being larger than predicted further implies not only that price controls are no general cure for unfair access but that price controls can be a source of such unfairness.

Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/686479 (application/pdf)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/686479 (text/html)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:scerev:doi:10.1086/686479

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Supreme Court Economic Review from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().