Discrete Rent-Seeking Games with an Application to Evidence Production

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci and Lewis A. Kornhauser

Supreme Court Economic Review, 2020, vol. 28, issue 1, 285 - 321

Abstract: Evidence production at trial, the accumulation of patents in a technological race, and lobbying are contests that often involve strategic choices over a discrete set of options. The literature has primarily focused on games with continuous effort choices. We fill this gap by studying a rent-seeking game with discrete effort choices and, for a significant class of games, derive a transformation rule that allows one to find the equilibrium of the discrete game from the equilibrium of the continuous game, which is much simpler to identify. We also discuss the limits of this approach and how well the continuous game approximates the discrete one.

Date: 2020
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