A repeated game of self regulation

Javier Nunez

Estudios de Economia, 2000, vol. 27, issue 1 Year 2000, 33-54

Abstract: This paper analyses incentives for self-regulation of quality from a principal-agent perspective, in a context of repeated interaction between a Self-Regulatory Organization (SRO) and consumers who can not observe SRO vigilance choice or fraud perfectly. This work unveils five obstacles for positive SRO vigilance to occur in equilibrium. However, this article also shows that public regulation in parallel to Self-Regulation can enhance SRO incentives to monitor quality and reduce fraud. Therefore, defying conventional wisdom, a mix of public and self regulation may be preferred because it would benefit from SROs informational advantage about quality, while public regulation would provide the incentives to monitor quality that may be absent otherwise.

Keywords: Self-Regulation; Quality Regulation; fraud; corruption. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K20 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:udc:esteco:v:27:y:2000:i:1:p:33-54

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