 Wage bargaining and partial ownershipJuan Bárcena-Ruiz and María Luz Campo Estudios de Economia, 2010, vol. 37, issue 1 Year 2010, 27-42 Abstract: This paper analyzes wage negotiation between firms and unions when cross-participation exists at ownership level. We consider two shareholders and two firms: one firm is jointly owned by the two shareholders and the other is owned by a single shareholder. Labor is unionized and the firms produce substitute products. We show that partial ownership increases the bargaining strength of the firm owned by a single shareholder; although this firm pays lower wages produces less output than the other firm. Compared with the case in which each firm is owned by a single shareholder, partial ownership reduces the wage paid by firms, the output of industry and therefore employment. Whether firms obtain greater or lower profit depends on the degree to which goods are substitutes. In fact, we obtain the surprising result that when the degree to which goods are substitutes is low enough, the firm that is owned by a single shareholder makes more profit than the other firm. Keywords: Partial Ownership; Wage Bargaining; Heterogeneous Goods (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:udc:esteco:v:37:y:2010:i:1:p:27-42 Access Statistics for this article Estudios de Economia is currently edited by Rómulo Chumacero More articles in Estudios de Economia from University of Chile, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC. |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.