Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Cournot game

Aitor Ciarreta and Carlos Gutierrez-Hita ()

Estudios de Economia, 2013, vol. 40, issue 2 Year 2013, 247-254

Abstract: In this paper we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n oligopolistic firms that compete à la Cournot. It is shown how in the presence of detection lags optimal punishments fail to restore cooperation as long as the number of lags increases. Moreover, collusion sustainability is difficult to achieve also if the number of firms is low.

Keywords: Optimal punishments; detection lags; collusion sustainability. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:udc:esteco:v:40:y:2013:i:2:p:247-254

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