Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Cournot game
Aitor Ciarreta and
Carlos Gutierrez-Hita ()
Estudios de Economia, 2013, vol. 40, issue 2 Year 2013, 247-254
In this paper we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n oligopolistic firms that compete à la Cournot. It is shown how in the presence of detection lags optimal punishments fail to restore cooperation as long as the number of lags increases. Moreover, collusion sustainability is difficult to achieve also if the number of firms is low.
Keywords: Optimal punishments; detection lags; collusion sustainability. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:udc:esteco:v:40:y:2013:i:2:p:247-254
Access Statistics for this article
Estudios de Economia is currently edited by Rómulo Chumacero
More articles in Estudios de Economia from University of Chile, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Verónica Kunze ().