Lifetime Employment and Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Profit Maximising and Joint-Stock Firms

Kazuhiro Ohnishi ()
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Kazuhiro Ohnishi: Institute for Basic Economic Science, Japan.

Institutions and Economies (formerly known as International Journal of Institutions and Economies), 2014, vol. 6, issue 3, 1-14

Abstract: This paper investigates endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly consisting of a profit-maximising firm and a joint-stock firm. There are two stages and the firms simultaneously and independently announce in which stage they will offer lifetime employment as a strategic commitment. If both firms decide to offer lifetime employment in the same stage, a simultaneous commitment game occurs, whereas if both firms choose different stages, a sequential commitment game arises. At the end of the game, each firm simultaneously and independently chooses its actual output. The paper presents the equilibrium of the endogenous-timing mixed duopoly model.

Keywords: Endogenous Timing; Profit-Maximising Firm; Joint-Stock Firm; Lifetime Employment; Strategic Commitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D21 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:umk:journl:v:6:y:2014:i:3:p:1-14

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