Redes optimas con costos acumulativos y comunicación bidireccional

Juan Larrosa () and Fernando Tohmé

Estudios Economicos, 2005, vol. 022 (Nueva Serie), issue 45, 67-88

Abstract: This work is an extension of Larrosa y Tohmé (2003)'s approach only differing in the agents' payoff function. This modification allows that information flows in both ways. Costs still are paid for who initiates the connection and this asymmetry reveals changes in the equilibrium topology. We find several optimal topologies as Nash equilibrium but only the sequential linear network with intermediate activation nodes as strict Nash equilibrium, i.e., agents are set in line and every intermediate agent connect with her two immediate neighbors. This way, cost acummulation is interrupted and profits are maximized

Keywords: juegos de formación de redes; comunicación bidireccional; red de línea; network formation games; two-way flow communication; linear network (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 L13 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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