Percepciones de injusticia y corrupción: el castigo de los evasores

Victoria Giarrizzo () and Nicolás Scolnic ()

Estudios Economicos, 2011, vol. 028 (Nueva Serie), issue 57, 33-57

Abstract: Tax evasion studies tend to focus on the taxpayer as the only subjects on which induce changes for improvements in tax revenues. However, recent studies indicate that State's behavior determines the actions of individuals. If the State is conceived as a corrupt institution that manages the resources inefficiently, taxpayers punish with avoidance and find easy justification to his bad fiscal behavior. In this scheme, evasion does not impact on the morale of individuals or affect their reputation, and finding solutions becomes difficult. This paper analyzes the avoidance as a dynamic 'tax relationship' between the State and its citizens with shared responsibilities where only simultaneous changes in both actors will reduce informality

Keywords: evasión; contribuyente; estado; responsabilidad; evasion; taxpayer; state; responsibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H24 H26 H30 K42 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uns:esteco:v:28:y:2011:i:57:p:33-57

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