Análisis comparativo de los diferentes modelos de corrupción en subastas

Andrés Fioriti ()

Estudios Economicos, 2012, vol. 029 (Nueva Serie), issue 59, 31-57

Abstract: This paper analyzes the different papers that are framed in corruption, not only in auctions but also in procurements. This survey only discusses corruption in one-dimensional auctions. The division of cases depends on the nature of the corrupt agreement, whether it is exogenous or endogenous

Keywords: corrupción; subastas; licitaciones; corruption; auctions; procurements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://revistas.uns.edu.ar/ee/article/view/762/440 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uns:esteco:v:29:y:2012:i:59:p:31-57

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Estudios Economicos from Universidad Nacional del Sur, Departamento de Economia Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Nelly A. José () and ().