Rationality and uncertainty
Andrew Postlewaite and
David Schmeidler
Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali, 2012, vol. 120, issue 3, 289-294
Abstract:
Experimental psychologists and economists construct an individual or interactive decision situation in the laboratory. They find non-negligible differences between the observed behavior of participants and the theoretically implied behavior. We refer here to the expected utility theory and to strategic equilibrium in non-cooperative game theory. We comment on the question whether rationality, implies these theoretical behaviors and whether the non-negligible differences as above imply that participants in experiments are irrational. We also comment on the relation between rationality and consistency, in particular in situations of uncertainty.
Keywords: Biases; Decision making; Bayesian; Behavioral Economics; Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vep:journl:y:2012:v:120:i:3:p:289-294
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