 The discrepancy between "ideal" and "real world" international tax rules. What drives politicians when making the rules?Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali, 2012, vol. 120, issue 4, 371-398 Abstract: The current international tax system diverges greatly from a theoretically ‘‘optimal’’ tax system. One reason for this discrepancy may be that politicians strive for other objectives rather than making tax rules that comply with the theoretical concepts of optimal taxation. In this article, I overview the approaches used in the economic and legal literature to explain the motivations of policymakers involved in international taxation and contrast them with ‘real world’ observations. The article illustrates that the making of international tax policy is affected by various factors: the structure of the international tax system, domestic pressure groups, along with self-interested politicians and bureaucrats. Considering the complexity of the conditions under which international tax policy is made, it is not astonishing that international tax law deviates significantly from the principles characterizing ‘‘ideal’’ taxation. Keywords: international taxation; efficiency norms; Public Choice; Game Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vep:journl:y:2012:v:120:i:4:p:371-398 Access Statistics for this article Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali is currently edited by Maurizio Baussola More articles in Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali from Vita e Pensiero, Pubblicazioni dell'Universita' Cattolica del Sacro Cuore |
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