 THE FIRM, AS STRUCTURE OF ECONOMIC GOVERNANCESilvia Elena Isachi
Journal of Financial and Monetary Economics, 2016, vol. 3, issue 1, 123-130 Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to approach the theory of the governance structures, i.e., the firm, the market and the hybrid form of organization, starting from several conceptual limitations between the terms of governance and the governance proper. Each structure of governance relies on a particular type of contract (institutional component) and varies with the characteristics of the transactions. The basic distinction between the firm and the market is that the firm relies in authority in allocating the resources. Then use of the authority relations gives an advantage to the firm compared to the market, the gain from lower transaction costs. The administrative decision presumes taxation costs that are lower than the costs of negotiation and taxation of each contract of the independent transactions performed on the market. Keywords: governance structures; firm; market; hybrid governance form; transaction cost (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vls:rojfme:v:3:y:2016:i:1:p:123-130 Access Statistics for this article More articles in Journal of Financial and Monetary Economics from Centre of Financial and Monetary Research "Victor Slavescu" Contact information at EDIRC. |
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