Relational Incentives in Chinese Family Firms

Jiancai Pi

Panoeconomicus, 2011, vol. 58, issue 4, 511-524

Abstract: This paper mainly discusses the choice of managerial compensation contracts in Chinese family firms. Relation or guanxi in Chinese language is an important factor that should be considered because it can bring the shirking cost to the relation-based manager and the caring cost to the owner under Chinese-style differential mode of association (“chaxu geju”). Our theoretical analysis shows that under some conditions it is optimal for the owner to choose the efficiency wage contract, and that under other conditions it is optimal for the owner to choose the share-based incentive contract. Key words: Managerial compensation, Efficiency wage contract, Share-based incentive contract, Relation (Guanxi), Chinese family firm.JEL: L20, M21, J33.

Keywords: Managerial compensation; Efficiency wage contract; Share-based incentive contract; Relation (Guanxi); Chinese family firm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://panoeconomicus.org/index.php/jorunal/article/view/169/163 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:voj:journl:v:58:y:2011:i:4:p:511-524:id:169

Access Statistics for this article

Panoeconomicus is currently edited by Kosta Josifidis

More articles in Panoeconomicus from Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia ().