The Principal-Agent Problems in American Class Actions

Tatiana Markova ()
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Tatiana Markova: Sofia University "St. Kliment Ohridski"

Izvestia Journal of the Union of Scientists - Varna. Economic Sciences Series, 2014, issue 1, 124-131

Abstract: The article has made an analysis of the situation in the collective proceedings in the USA when agency problems arise between the class, i.e. the community of victims participating in the procedure (principal) and the lawyer of these victims (agent). A series of such problems are identified and examined. How could they be restricted or resolved? The analysis of the respective proposals shows that they are hard to be realized in practice as a whole. It proves that in case of offenses that have led to numerous victims with large damages, individual claims may take advantage with view of the compensation. We also demonstrate in what sense the analysis of the agency problems in the US class action is useful to prevent some serious ones to occur in the European court practice.

Keywords: class action; agency problems; victim compensation; advantage of the individual procedure; organizational schemes of agent relationship (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vra:journl:y:2014:i:1:p:124-131

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