Uncertainty And Social Insurance Policy

Dimitar Kanev

Business & Management Compass, 2010, issue 4, 17-30

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to present scientific arguments for the genesis and structure of effective policy toward social risks. Its theoretical basis is the theory of rational choice under conditions of incomplete information. First it analyzes the situation in which information about risks is complete, and then it considers the case with information asymmetry. Following these steps, the article reveals market solution s to the problem of distribution of social risks and answers the questions when, how and to what extent the state should intervene in these decisions. Different theoretical conclusions are made and as an effective and fair mechanism of covering social risk s is recommended the combination of partial compulsory social insurance and supplementary private voluntarily insurance.

JEL-codes: D33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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