The Liquidity Trap, Democracy and Central Bank Independence

Lucian Croitoru

Scientific Annals of Economics and Business, 2014, vol. 61, issue 1, 14

Abstract: In the wake of the financial crisis, central banks in developed countries performed unconventional operations that are fiscal in nature. On one hand, we support the view that such operations, which are not fully democratic, might lead to loss of central bank operational independence and discuss some difficulties that central banks might face when reversing quantitative easing. On the other hand, we show that, in the middle of a financial crisis, such operations are best performed by central banks. To avoid this potential conflict, the society needs to identify the best means by which the responsibility for quasi-fiscal operations implemented by the central bank is transferred to a democratic structure

Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.2478/aicue-2014-0002 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vrs:aicuec:v:61:y:2014:i:1:p:14:n:2

DOI: 10.2478/aicue-2014-0002

Access Statistics for this article

Scientific Annals of Economics and Business is currently edited by Ovidiu Stoica

More articles in Scientific Annals of Economics and Business from Sciendo
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().