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Geopolitics Taking the Signature from the Russian-Estonian Border Treaty (2005)

Alatalu Toomas ()
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Alatalu Toomas: Institute of Political Science and Governance, Tallinn University Narva mnt 25, Tallinn 10120, Estonia

TalTech Journal of European Studies, 2013, vol. 3, issue 2, 96-119

Abstract: Explaining the withdrawal of his signature from the Estonian- Russian Border Agreement, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov announced on June 27, 2005 that “they in the EU might have succumbed to the temptation of telling us to ratify it […] on your side also, with some interpretations attached, so that the treaty can enter into force. To stop the EU from falling into this temptation, we have withdrawn our signature. There will be no treaty”. Thus, Moscow actually punished the European Union, which seems logical as with regard to geopolitics and geostrategy, the border negotiations were held in the buffer zone between the European Union and Russia. In 2004-2005 Russia held simultaneous and also interconnected border negotiations with Japan, China, Kazakhstan, Latvia and Estonia, with agreements eventually signed only with China and Kazakhstan. Failures with Japan, Latvia and Estonia derived from Moscow’s position to keep all gains of World War II. At the same time Russia had related all its foreign affairs with the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II held in Russia, which was curiously used by the young Georgian leader Mikheil Saakashvili, whose quick and clear manoeuvres approved by the West turned the ordinary Rimland country Georgia into a classic geopolitical pivot. And all this was done at the expense of Russia’s influence. The highlight of the process was Saakashvili’s statement that he will come to Moscow on May 9th only if Russia agrees to withdraw its military bases from Georgia. The Kremlin considered it best to agree, however, as the European Council aside the US, uniting the problems of Estonia, Latvia and the non-EU member Georgia, also began to praise the latter for overcoming Russia, Moscow decided to punish the nearest available EU member in the given situation by withdrawing its signature from the Russian-Estonian border treaty.

Keywords: buffer state; soft buffer; Estonian-Russian border treaty; geopolitical pivot and re-orientation geopolitics; geopolitics in EU-Russian relations; Georgia’s revolutionary invasion to world policy-making; geostrategy; Russia’s simultaneous handling of five border treaties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vrs:bjeust:v:3:y:2013:i:2:p:96-119:n:6

DOI: 10.2478/bjes-2013-0015

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