(Re)-structuring the Ceo’s compensation—the case of Israel

Mroczek-Dąbrowska Katarzyna () and Shemesh Yaron ()
Additional contact information
Mroczek-Dąbrowska Katarzyna: Department of International Competitiveness, Poznań University of Economics and Business, al. Niepodległości 10, 61-875Poznań, Poland
Shemesh Yaron: Department of International Competitiveness, Poznań University of Economics and Business, al. Niepodległości 10, 61-875Poznań, Poland

Economics and Business Review, 2020, vol. 6, issue 3, 105-117

Abstract: The executive compensation issue continues to cause protest due to the increasing number of cases of an unjustifiably high level of pay. The main conflict arises from the misalignment of interests between the short-term expectations of the manager and long-term needs of the shareholders. Since there are no universal rules on how to price the executive performance companies reach for different means of establishing the CEO’s compensation and ascertaining manager’s commitment towards maintaining a company’s value. The issue becomes more complex once the compensation rules are not a direct effect of the market power game but are additionally restricted by government. The aim of the paper is to discuss corporate government policies introduced in Israel and their impact on executive compensation level and structure. Israel is amongst those countries that partially regulate CEO compensation and thus the Israeli experience can add to the understanding of the effectiveness of modern corporate governance.

Keywords: CEO compensation; inequalities; compensation gap; agency theory; principal; agent conflict; corporate governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G34 K12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.18559/ebr.2020.3.6 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vrs:ecobur:v:6:y:2020:i:3:p:105-117:n:6

DOI: 10.18559/ebr.2020.3.6

Access Statistics for this article

Economics and Business Review is currently edited by Tadeusz Kowalski

More articles in Economics and Business Review from Sciendo
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().