Strategic option pricing
Bieta Volker,
Broll Udo () and
Siebe Wilfried
Additional contact information
Bieta Volker: Technische Universität Dresden, 01062Dresden, Germany
Broll Udo: Center of International Studies (ZIS), Technische Universität Dresden, 01062Dresden, Germany
Siebe Wilfried: Universität Rostock, 18051Rostock, Germany
Economics and Business Review, 2020, vol. 6, issue 3, 118-129
Abstract:
In this paper an extension of the well-known binomial approach to option pricing is presented. The classical question is: What is the price of an option on the risky asset? The traditional answer is obtained with the help of a replicating portfolio by ruling out arbitrage. Instead a two-person game from the Nash equilibrium of which the option price can be derived is formulated. Consequently both the underlying asset’s price at expiration and the price of the option on this asset are endogenously determined. The option price derived this way turns out, however, to be identical to the classical no-arbitrage option price of the binomial model if the expiration-date prices of the underlying asset and the corresponding risk-neutral probability are properly adjusted according to the Nash equilibrium data of the game.
Keywords: option pricing; game theory; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 G12 G13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vrs:ecobur:v:6:y:2020:i:3:p:118-129:n:7
DOI: 10.18559/ebr.2020.3.7
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