Evaluation of Payoff Matrices for Non-Cooperative Games via Processing Binary Expert Estimations

Romanuke Vadim ()
Additional contact information
Romanuke Vadim: Khmelnitskiy National University, 11 Institutskaya Str., 29016, Khmelnitskiy, Ukraine

Information Technology and Management Science, 2016, vol. 19, issue 1, 10-15

Abstract: A problem of evaluating the non-cooperative game model is considered in the paper. The evaluation is understood in the sense of obtaining the game payoff matrices whose entries are single-point values. Experts participating in the estimation procedure make their judgments on all the game situations for every player. A form of expert estimations is suggested. The form is of binary type, wherein the expert’s judgment is either 1 or 0. This type is the easiest to be implemented in social networks. For most social networks, 1 can be a “like” (the currently evaluated situation is advantageous), and 0 is a “dislike” (disadvantageous). A method of processing expert estimations is substantiated. Two requirements are provided for obtaining disambiguous payoff averages along with the clustered payoff matrices.

Keywords: Estimation procedure; expert’s binary judgment; non-cooperative game; payoff averages; payoff matrice evaluation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/itms-2016-0004 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vrs:itmasc:v:19:y:2016:i:1:p:10-15:n:4

DOI: 10.1515/itms-2016-0004

Access Statistics for this article

Information Technology and Management Science is currently edited by J. Merkurjevs

More articles in Information Technology and Management Science from Sciendo
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().