Schumpeterian Behavior in a CPR Game: Experimental Evidence from Colombian Fisheries Under TURF’s Management

Arroyo-Mina José Santiago and Guerrero Daniel
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Arroyo-Mina José Santiago: Professor and Regional Project Manager, Universidad del Valle, Colombia
Guerrero Daniel: Doctorate Student, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Spain

Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 2018, vol. 9, issue 4, 109-119

Abstract: This paper studies the behavior of Pacific-Colombian fishermen in a Common-Pool Resource game. The results show that decision-making depends on fishermen’s schooling, sex and last round payoffs. Focusing on individual information, we observe that human capital, measured in years of schooling, has a significant effect on decision-making. Specifically, players with higher schooling adjust their decisions towards on lower levels of harvest, leading closer to the cooperative solution. This behavior could be explained by the better-educated subjects’ improved understanding of the information available to them and possible coordination of efforts due to TURF-based management in the zone.

Keywords: Common-Pool Resources; Non-cooperatives Games; Human Capital; Fishery; Agricultural Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vrs:mjsosc:v:9:y:2018:i:4:p:109-119:n:11

DOI: 10.2478/mjss-2018-0120

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