Quo vadis, Schuldenbremse? Über Sinn und Unsinn detaillierter Defizit- und Schuldenregelungen im Grundgesetz

Dirk Ehnts

Wirtschaftsdienst, 2024, vol. 104, issue 1, 25-28

Abstract: The German debt brake forces the German government to target a very specific public deficit to GDP ratio. A ruling of the German constitutional court has drawn attention to the debt brake, as it is to be enforced more tightly than the federal German government previously thought. In this article, the author argues that the debt brake should be abolished. It does not do what it is supposed to do – the sustainability of public debt depends on the European Central Bank’s Dealer of Last Resort function and nothing else. As a side effect, the debt brake curtails government spending at a time of close to zero net public investment and huge requirements for more public spending.

JEL-codes: E62 H60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.2478/wd-2024-0010 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vrs:wirtsc:v:104:y:2024:i:1:p:25-28:n:10

DOI: 10.2478/wd-2024-0010

Access Statistics for this article

Wirtschaftsdienst is currently edited by Nicole Waidlein

More articles in Wirtschaftsdienst from Sciendo
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().