Trumps Zollpolitik: Mehr Macht durch Gewährung von Ausnahmen

Scherrer Christoph

Wirtschaftsdienst, 2025, vol. 105, issue 6, 434-438

Abstract: An important motivation for President Trump’s tariff escalation is often overlooked: tariffs serve Trump as a powerful domestic and foreign policy instrument. This instrument consists of granting exemptions from tariffs for good behavior and denying such benefits or imposing even higher tariffs in the case of a lack of support for Trump or even opposition. The article first discusses the contradictory nature of the officially stated goals of Trump’s tariffs, then describes the policy of granting exemptions to foreign nations and domestic companies in Trump’s first presidency. The article also presents evidence for a repeat of such favoritism in Trump’s second term.

JEL-codes: F13 N72 P10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vrs:wirtsc:v:105:y:2025:i:6:p:434-438:n:1015

DOI: 10.2478/wd-2025-0111

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