Enhancing the Capability of Central Finance Agencies
Richard Allen () and
Francesco Grigoli ()
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Richard Allen: World Bank
World Bank - Economic Premise, 2012, issue 73, 1-7
Abstract:
A well-organized and effective finance ministry and its associated central finance agencies (CFAs) are essential to good fiscal outcomes. Recent studies of CFAs in selected low-income countries demonstrate that their organizational structure varies widely and that decision making on public finance is strongly influenced by political economy factors. This note presents some common themes arising from the case studies and provides some descriptive evidence about the organizational structure of the CFAs. This note also includes evidence of a “U-curve” pattern in the development of the organizational structure of CFAs over the long term. It confirms that political economy analysis, though difficult to apply in practice, is highly relevant in the development of reform strategies for strengthening CFAs and public financial management systems.
Keywords: finance ministry; central finance agencies; fiscal; public finance; political economy; low-income countries; development; reform; public financial management; World Bank (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E6 E61 E63 F33 F5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Enhancing the Capability of Central Finance Agencies (2012) 
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