Rationality in the Theory of the Firm

Russell K. Standish and Steve Keen
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Russell K. Standish: University of New South Wales, Australia

World Economic Review, 2015, vol. 2015, issue 5, 101

Abstract: We have previously presented a critique of the standard Marshallian theory of the firm, and developed an alternative formulation that better agreed with the results of simulation. An incorrect mathematical fact was used in our previous presentation. This paper deals with correcting the derivation of the Keen equilibrium, and generalising the result to the asymmetric case. As well, we discuss the notion of rationality employed, and how this plays out in a two player version of the game.

Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wea:worler:v:2015:y:2015:i:5:p:101

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