Pension expectations as disincentives to job mobility

Izzet Sahin

Applied Stochastic Models and Data Analysis, 1997, vol. 13, issue 2, 127-148

Abstract: I address the measurement problem of the extent to which workers in an industry face disincentives to changing employment because of an interest in private pension benefits. I take an individual worker as the unit of analysis and represent job mobility over the work life by a time‐varying point process. I treat the various plan types (pension systems) in a unified way through a general reward function (accumulated benefit function). By merging the employment termination process with this function, I derive two other benefit functions to measure the pension expectations of a worker from current and future employments. I then use these functions to construct a loss function that trades off the benefit gains and losses faced by a worker in a pension system at the time of a potential job change. I apply the methodology developed in the paper to the United States pension system, using data from the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 1997
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https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0747(199706)13:23.0.CO;2-8

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:apsmda:v:13:y:1997:i:2:p:127-148

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