PROTOCOL: Does executive compensation predict publicly traded firms’ financial performance or inaccurate financial reporting?

Denise M. Rousseau, Donna Beck, ByeongJo Kim, Ryan Splenda and Sarah Young

Campbell Systematic Reviews, 2019, vol. 15, issue 4

Abstract: Abstract This is the protocol for a Campbell review. The objectives are as follows: One goal of this systematic review is to identify whether incentive terms in CEO contracts predict firm financial performance over time; a second goal is to identify whether incentive terms in CEO contracts predict subsequent inaccurate financial reporting as manifest in restatement of accounting data due to errors or other distortions in reporting financial information.

Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:camsys:v:15:y:2019:i:4:n:e1064

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