EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Cumulative Prospect Theory and Managerial Incentives for Fraudulent Financial Reporting

Michael K. Fung

Contemporary Accounting Research, 2015, vol. 32, issue 1, 55-75

Abstract: Using samples of restating and nonrestating U.S. firms, the study empirically investigates the relationship between the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting and accounting†based performance outcomes. The outcomes are framed as gains and losses relative to a reference point, defined as the mean performance of industry peers. Consistent with cumulative prospect theory (CPT), the findings show that fraud incidence is positively (negatively) related to the probability of a loss (gain); more (less) sensitive to the probability of a loss (gain) (i.e., loss†aversion); and more (less) sensitive to an extra unit of the probability at a high†or low†(medium†) probability level (i.e., nonlinear probability weighting function). The study extends the fraudulent financial reporting literature by formulating fraud incidence as a function of performance outcomes using peer performance as a reference point. By testing CPT's individual†level behavioral implications on firm†level archival data, the study reconceptualizes the investigation of fraudulent financial reporting in terms of risk attitude and extends prior investigations of CPT from laboratory experiments to a real†world setting of fraudulent financial reporting.

Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12074

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:coacre:v:32:y:2015:i:1:p:55-75

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Contemporary Accounting Research from John Wiley & Sons
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:wly:coacre:v:32:y:2015:i:1:p:55-75